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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ST ATE O.F UTAH,
Plrti Ill iff-R C8,1jOJld c ll t,
vs.

SYLYESTER SCOTT,

Case No.
10876

Defenda nt-ApiJcllr: ;1 t.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATE~IENT

OF NATURE OF CASE

The appellant, Sylvester Scott, appeals from a
judgment of conviction finding him guilty of burglary
in the second degree.

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
The appellant was found guilty by jury verdict
of burglary in the second degree. The trial judge sen1

tenced the appellant to the Utah State Prison for an
indeterminate term as provided by law.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests that the judgment of the
trial court be affirmed.

STATE.MENT OF FACTS
On or about the night of April 18, 1966, the U and
I :Furniture Store in Ogden, Utah was burglarized.
Three television sets and a coffee table were discovered
m1ssmg. .Mr. Gary Bosworth, the manager of the
burglarized store, testified that the appellant had come
to the store several times prior to the burglary to look
at a three-piece sectional couch ( T-16) .
On the morning of April 18, 1966, appellant
entered the store with three other persons, two of whom
used a restroom located in the office of the store ( T-36).
During the afternoon of the following day Mr. Bosworth discovered three televisions and a coffee table
missing (T-19). On the day following the discovery
of the theft, l.\fr. Bosworth found that the screen to
the office restroom had been removed and that a foot
mark had been left on a crushed facial tissue box on
the top of the toilet tank ( T-57-58) .
Copeland Griffin testified that he had been approached by the appellant and one 'Villiam Coleman
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and asked whether he would haul some furniture for
them from a place on 'Vall Avenue and Riverdale
( T-69). Griffin testified that he told them he could
not do it, but that he subsequently went to Wall Avenue
and Riverdale on the night of April 18, 1966, where
he observed Coleman and the appellant removing a
coffee table and a television set from the store (T69-70).

On the basis of information received from Mr.
Griffin, a search warrant was issued to James Wold,
Chief of Police at South Ogden, Utah, who recovered
one of the television sets and what appeared to be the
coffee table stolen from the U and I furniture Store
from the residence of Carol Jean Craig ( T-137-139).
Counsel for defense presented two witnesses, Carol
Jean Craig and Annette House, who testified that they
had each purchased televlsion sets from Copeland
Griffin (T-178-195).
James Wold testified that Carol Jean Craig had
first told him that a person named Davis had sold her
the television set, but later changed the name to O'Neal
(T-186-188) and that she was married to Sylvester
Scott (T-139) ..Miss Craig testified that the reason Scott
came to her house is that she liked him a lot and that
she had had his baby (T-189).
Annette House testified that she had known 'Villiam Coleman for many years and that the defendants
would come and stay at her house for weeks at a time
(T-201).
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The record discloses that the attorney for 'Villiam
Coleman, Robert Phillips, had entered a "Notice of
Alibi" to the effect that 'Villiam Coleman had been in
the presence of Linda Martin and Annette House on
the night of the burglary (T-201). Mr. Phillips took
the witness stand and testified that his client had indicated that he had an alibi and that the names of Linda
Martin and Annette House had been given to his secretary. Through some mistake, these names appeared
on the "Notice of Alibi" ( T-208) .
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY PERlMITTED COPELAND GRIFFIN TO TESTIFY.
The appellant contends that Copeland Griffin is
incompetent to testify because Griffin had been found
legally insane and committed to the Utah State l\Iental
Hospital in 1962, ~nd the trial court made no effort to
deter~ine whether he understood the nature of an oath.
File 7091 from the Second District Court shows
that Copeland Griffin .was adjudged legally insane by
the Honorable John F. 'Vahlquist, November 1, 1962,
and ordered committed to the Utah State Mental Hospital for an indeterminate period of time or until he
recovered at which time he was to be returned to the
Weber County Jail for prosecution.
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By order dated November 12, 1965, a sanity hearing was ordered for Copeland Griff in to be set by the
court within the next ten days. On November 30, 1965,
Copeland Griffin entered a plea of guilty to a reduced
charge of petty larceny. The court entered sentence
and ruled that the defendant could be returned to the
State Hospital at any time on a determination by the
State Hospital. On December 5, 1965, the State Hospital discharged Copeland Griffin, listing his condition
as "'improved,,
.
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-48-5 (Supp. 1967) provides:
If upon the examination provided for herein
the accused is determined to be insane, the judge
making such determination shall order him com ..
mitted to the state hospital, there to remain in
custody until he shall become sane ...
Upon the accused becoming sane after commitment to the state hospital the superintendent
thereof shall certify such fact to the district court
in and for the county from which the accused
was committed, and thereupon the judge of such
court shall order the accused returned to the
original custody from which he was taken in
execution of his commitment, and upon such
return all proceedings against him suspended
upon his commitment shall be resumed . . .
The record shows that Griffin was released from
the state mental hospital and returned to the custody
of jurisdiction from which he was taken and that the
court accepted a plea of guilty to a reduced charge. of
petit larceny and entered judgment.
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In Smith v. Roach, 56 'Vyo. 205, 106 P.2d 536
( 1940), under a statute which provided that when any
person committed to the state mental hospital is declared not insane, he shall be released, the court held
the fact of petitioner's sanity to be established, at least
prima facie, by his discharge from the state hospital.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-48-1 (1953) provides that no
person while insane shall be tried, adjudged to punish
or punished for a public offense.
Since the record shows that Griffin entered a plea
of guilty to the reduced charge of petit larceny and was
subsequently sentenced by the same trial judge who
had found him to be insane, that court necessarily had
to determine him sane for purposes of trial. In the absence of a showing to the contrary, it is presumed that
judicial proceedings are regular in all respects. State
v. Reay, 13 Utah2d 79, 368 P.2d 595 (1962).
Respondent submits the Copeland Griffin's sanity
was established, at least prima facie, by his discharge
from the state mental hospital and by the court entering
judgment against him.
Respondent further submits that it is within the
sound discretion of the trial court to determine the
competency of a witness.
In State v. Williams, 11 Utah 379, 180 P.2d 551
( 1947) , where the competency of the alleged victim,
a thirteen year old girl whose mental age was between
eight and ten years, was challenged, the court held:
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. . . the trial judge had the advantage of
having the witness before him. He was in a position to observe not only her demeanor but the
tempo of question and answer, the attitude and
tone of voice of counsel and the courtroom enviroumen t. Hence, much of importance to his
decision respecting the competency of the witness was available to the trial judge which the
record does not reveal to us. He exercised his
discretion in light of such additional factors, and
we are unable to say with conviction that his
ruling thereon was an abuse of such discretion.
The record shows that the trial judge in this case
was the same judge who had earlier found the witness
insane; it was the same trial judge who later accepted
a plea of guilty from the witness and entered judgment against him. The same trial judge questioned the
witness to determine whether he had the mental and
physical capacity to understand and respond to questions put to him. The record is replete with questions
put to the witness by all counsel and answers from the
witness which cogently demonstrate the witness' ability
to understand, comprehend and respond.
Respondent submits that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in permitting Copeland Griffin to
testify.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
NOT INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE
LA 'V OF COMPLICITY.
7

Appellant contends that the evidence was sufficient
to require the trial court to instruct the jury concerning
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-31-18 (1953) which requires that
the testimony of an accomplice be corroborated by other
evidence.
The only testimony which might connect Griffin
with the crime is that of Carol Jean Craig and Annette
House. Both testified that Griffin had sold them television sets which were later identified as those stolen
from the U and I Furniture Stores. Their testimony,
if believed, could establish only that Griffin was in the
possession of stolen goods after the burglary.
Respondent submits that there is no evidence to
support the appellant's contention that a jury could
find that Copeland Griffin was an accomplice.
In People v. Chadwick, 7 Utah 134, 25 Pac. 737
( 1891), the court held that an accessory after the fact
was not an accomplice within the meaning of § 5049,
2 Comp. Laws, 1888, 710, from which Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-31-18 (1953) is taken with minor changes. The
court further held in Chadwick that if the witness were
not an accomplice in the crime, it was not necessary
that his testimony be corroborated.
In State v. Bowman, 92 Utah 540, 548 ,70 P.2d
458, 461 ( 1937) , the court held:
An accessory after the fact is not an accomplice,
and neither is one who might be charged or con·
victed of some other crime not the crime for
which the defendant was on trial.
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Since there was no evidence that Copeland Griffin
participated in the burglary, it was not error for the
trial court not to have instructed the jury on the requirement under Utah law that an accomplice's testimony
must be corroborated by other evidence.
Respondent further submits that the appellant
should not be permitted to object to an issue raised for
the first time on appeal where no instruction on the
testimony of an accomplice was requested and where
no objection was made when the court failed to give
instructions on the testimony of an accomplice.
In State v. Blea, 20 Utah 2d 133, 434 P.2d 446
( 1967) , the court held that even if the law had been as
defendant contended, he was in a poor position to complain on appeal of failure to instruct the jury thereon
where he did not request any such instructions nor did he
take any exceptions to the f allure of the court to so
instruct.
Generally, unless an instruction is requested on
a special matter, failure to give it cannot be a basis of
claimed prejudicial error. State v. Owem, 15 Utah2d
123, 388 P.2d 797 (1964).

CONCLUSION
The evidence that Copeland Griffin had been
released from the State .Mental Hospital and had been
permitted to enter a plea of guilty to the charge of
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petty larceny is sufficient to show that the trial court :
did not abuse its discretion in permitting him to testify. •,
I

The trial court's determination that Copeland t
Griffin was a competent witness is further sustained f
by lVIr. Griff in' s ability to respond coherently to questions asked by both the prosecuting and defense attor-

i
i

I
instructing the I

~~.

The trial court did not err in not
I
jury on the law of complicity since the evidence did '.
not raise that issue and the appellant did not request
instructions on the law of accomplice nor did he object I
to the trial court not giving the instruction.

I

For these reasons, respondent requests that the
judgment of the trial court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
C. VAN DRUNEN
Chief Deputy Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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